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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 960656-CA

PAUL BURNINGHAM,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (URCrP), which allows the
prosecution to appeal from a final order of dismissal, the State of Utah appeals the trial court's
dismissal of this case. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because the appeal is taken from a
criminal case in a court of record. §78-2a-3(f) Utah Code Annotated (UCA).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this appeal, the State raises these two issues: (1) May an order of dismissal be construed
as a dismissal with prejudice if it does not explicitly so state?; and (2) May a trial court issue a
dismissal with prejudice if the criminal defendant has made no showing that a bar to further
prosecution is the only way in which he may be treated fairly? These issues concern questions of
law which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). These issues

were preserved for review by the State in its memorandum in support of its motion for
reconsideration submitted on August 9,1996. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, at appendix A. The trial court thereafter declined to hear further argument
regarding the issues raised in the State's motion for reconsideration,and instead executed its final
order of dismissal on October 2,1996. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of
Dismissal, at appendix B.

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This appeal does not directly implicate any specific statutory or constitutional construction,
but rather it regards the construction to be given to Rules 16 and 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (hereinafter URCrP). URCrP 16 addresses discovery in criminal cases, and URCrP 25
addresses the dismissal of criminal cases without trial. In relevant part, these rules provide:
"If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [pertaining to
discovery], the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed,
or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
URCrP 16(g) (emphasis added).
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance ofjustice, the court
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an
information or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to
trial...
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered
into the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon grounds that there was unreasonable delay,...
further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred...
URCrP 25 (emphasis added).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal taken by the State from a final order of dismissal of a criminal information
entered by Judge L. A. Dever of Division II of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County.
Statement of the Facts

On May 17,1995, the defendant, Paul Burningham, was arrested for driving while under
the influence of alcohol and for driving on a revoked license. Charges arising from this incident
were filed by the State on May 30,1995, and the case was assigned to Judge Phillip K. Palmer with
the case number 955017625 TC. As the case progressed toward trial, the State encountered some
difficulty in obtaining a video cassette recording of the arrest because the Highway Patrol trooper
had been reassigned from Salt Lake County to Green River, Utah. On October 23,1995, Judge
Palmer heard the defendant' s motion pertaining to a complaint that the State had committed a
discovery violation by its failure to provide the tape. In that motion, the defendant did not seek to
continue the trial so he could view the tape, or seek the tape's exclusion as evidence in the State's
case-in-chief, but rather he sought as his exclusive remedy the dismissal of the case. Judge Palmer
denied the defendant's motion, but the State was ordered to complete discovery within five days.
Docket for case 955017625 TC, at appendix C. The State was unable to obtain the video within
that time, and the State therefore submitted a motion to dismiss on October 31. See State's Motion
to Dismiss, at appendix C. The State's motion explicitly sought that the dismissal be without
prejudice. Id. The order of dismissal was executed by the Court on November 1,1995. See Order
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of Dismissal, at appendix E. Nothing in the order of dismissal stated that it was intended to have
any effect contrary to the State's motion that the case be dismissed without prejudice. Id.
On November 27,1995, after obtaining the tape, the State re-filed charges and the case was
assigned to Judge Dever with case number 955039908 TC. The case then progressed toward trial
until May of 1996 before the defendant filed the motion for dismissal before Judge Dever. See
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at appendix F. In that motion, the defendant asserted that Rule 41
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure barred the re-filing of a case once it had been voluntarily
dismissed, and that the State had voluntarily dismissed this case by its motion of October 31,1995.
Id. The defendant further asserted that he was entitled to attorney's fees as a result of the State's
renewing of the case. Id. Argument was heard by Judge Dever on August 5,1996, and although
Judge Dever agreed with the State that the defendant erroneously relied on the Rules of Civil
Procedure since URCrP 25 specifically addressed the dismissal of criminal cases without trial, the
judge nevertheless raised sua sponte the issue that Judge Palmer may have intended that his order of
dismissal be construed as a bar to further prosecution; he then ruled that the earlier dismissal had
been with prejudice because the State had not submitted its motion for dismissal-without-prejudice
until more than five days after Judge Palmer directed the State to complete discovery. Judge Dever
later declined the State's motion to reconsider his ruling. The written order of dismissal prescribed
by URCrP 25(c) was executed on October 2,1996. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order of Dismissal, at appendix B.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State argues that the dismissal-with-prejudice was entered in error for these two
reasons: (1) The order of dismissal entered by Judge Palmer and construed by Judge Dever did not
explicitly state that it would bar further prosecution, and was not accompanied by any statement of
reasons that would support a dismissal-with-prejudice, moreover, it was issued incident to the
State's motion to dismiss without prejudice, therefore the State was unfairly surprised by Judge
Dever's ruling; and (2) The defendant was never entitled to a dismissal-with-prejudice because
less severe remedies would have afforded him a fair trial.

ARGUMENT
I. Pursuant to URCrP 25(c), Orders of Dismissal Should be Construed as
Without Prejudice Unless Otherwise Explicitly Stated,
The rule governing the procedures to be followed in the dismissal of criminal cases without
trial is exclusively contained in URCrP 25. Rule 25(c) requires that orders of dismissal must be
accompanied by a statement of the reasons for dismissal, and this provision has been construed by
the Utah Court of Appeals as warranting the vacation of an order of dismissal for not recording
specific findings. Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452,456 (Utah App. 1996).
In Dorman-Ligh, the issue on appeal concerned dismissal-with-prejudice as the sanction for
actions the trial court characterized as prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 454. Although the Court of
Appeals held in Dorman-Ligh that the trial court had erroneously determined that it had issued a
binding order to the prosecutor, the court went on to criticize the trial court's elected sanction,
stating:

5

"Dismissal of a criminal information as a sanction against the prosecutor is rarely
appropriate, even if the prosecutor is in contempt of court. A dismissal can only be
entered pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 25(a)
provides for dismissal, in the trial court's discretion, "for substantial cause and in
the furtherance ofjustice." Utah R.Crim.P. 25(a). Rule 25 (b) mandates dismissal
for "unreasonable or unconstitutional delay" and for other very specific reasons.
Utah R.Crim.P. 25(b). In the rare case in which the trial court dismisses a criminal
information because of misbehavior by the prosecutor, the court must enter findings
that carefully specify which Rule 25 provisions it relied upon. See Utah R.Crim.P.
25(c) ("The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered
in the minutes").
Id. at 456 (emphasis added).

The State acknowledges that Dorman-Ligh was not published until after Judge Palmer's
order of dismissal was entered. The State asserts, however, that Judge Dever erred in failing to
construe the order of dismissal in light of Dorman-Ligh's guidance. This is so because without a
statement of specific findings justifying a dismissal-with-prejudice, the State is not afforded notice
that the clock has begun to run with respect to the State's right to take an appeal-as-of-right from a
final order of the court. Such a result as was reached by Judge Dever is particularly harsh under the
facts of this case, where the order of dismissal had been issued incident to the State's motion to
dismiss without prejudice, and where that order was executed by Judge Palmer without any further
comment. If a dismissal may be construed as with prejudice even if it does not explicitly so state,
then the State is placed in a substantially unfair position.

1

The State acknowledges that it was within the power of the State to have drafted its original order of dismissal to
explicitly state that it was without prejudice, and thus render this question moot, but even so, as set forth in part two
of this argument, because the defendant was never entitled to dismissal-with-prejudice, Judge Dever should not have
construed Judge Palmer's order to have granted the defendant any relief to which he was not entitled.
6

IL The Defendant was Never Entitled to a Dismissal-With-Prejudice.
A. The Defendant had a Duty to Mitigate.
As quoted above, this Court has stated that it is the rare circumstance when dismissal is an
appropriate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct—even if the prosecutor acts in contempt of court.
Id. This view of the law is consistent with the position taken in cases where the prosecutor has
failed to provide complete or timely discovery. These cases, as illustrated below, stand together for
the proposition that a defendant has an affirmative obligation to mitigate any violation of the rules
of discovery that might be encountered, and a defendant is only entitled to the remedy of dismissalwith-prejudice if no lesser remedy would afford a fair trial.
In State v.Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988), the prosecutor failed to disclose to defense
counsel statements made by the defendant to an investigating officer until shortly before trial. Id. at
882. Those statements were inconsistent with the account offered by an alibi witness, and when the
prosecutor offered the statements to rebut the alibi, the defense counsel objected; when the
statements were admitted over the objection, the defendant moved for a mistrial. Id. In reviewing
the issue raised by the defendant on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's
appropriate remedy for the untimely disclosure of the statements was to obtain a continuance—to
which he would have been entitled—so he could review his trial strategy in light of the challenge to
the alibi. Id. at 883. Because the defendant did not seek this remedy, and instead he sought a
harsher remedy to which he was not entitled, he waived the relief otherwise available to him. Id.
In State v. Christoffersou 793 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1990), on the morning of trial the
prosecutor learned of exculpatory statements of the defendant that contradicted an earlier
7

confession, but the statements were not disclosed to defense counsel. Id. at 947. The defendant did
not learn of the statements until they were introduced as testimony. Id. At that time, the defense
!

counsel did not object, move for a continuance, or request a mistrial, but rather the witness was
allowed to testify on direct examination, and then cross-examined, before the defense submitted a
motion to dismiss for the failure to sooner disclose the exculpatory statement. Id. Finding that the
defendant failed to mitigate the prosecutor's discovery violation by not seeking one of the specific
remedies afforded by Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court held
that the defendant had waived all relief. Id. at 948. Specifically, the Court stated: "Dismissal is
proper only when all other attempts to mitigate damage caused by unexpected evidence have
failed" Id. (Emphasis added).
The defendant in this case did not comport himself with this Utah case law by seeking to
mitigate a discovery violation, but rather he tried to exploit the circumstance in order to
manufacture a de facto acquittal without risking a resolution of the case on the merits. Pursuant to
Griffiths and Christofferson however, by engaging in this ploy, the defendant should not profit, but
rather he should be viewed as having waived any claim of prejudice whatsoever. This was the
position urged by the State at the August 2,1996, hearing. Finding #8, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal, at appendix B. This is the correct application of law.

B. The Defendant was Never Denied the Opportunity to Have a Fair Trial.
If the defendant had argued that he believed the undisclosed tape might have proved
exculpatory,2 or otherwise necessary to his defense, then URCrP 16(g) provides remedies other

2

An issue which is moot, since the tape is now available to the defendant.
8

than dismissal. He may have sought a continuance until he was afforded an opportunity to obtain
the missing material. Christofferson, supra. He could have also sought the tape's exclusion. See,
e.g., State v. Kull 688 P.2d 1327 (Ore. 1984) (defendant entitled to suppression of video tape
which was not provided in discovery until four days before trial). Otherwise, if he could not wait
because his ability to mount his defense would deteriorate over time, he should have made this
argument to Judge Palmer rather than waiting another five months before renewing his attempt to
dismiss this case before Judge Dever. By not making these arguments, the State submits that the
defendant was never concerned with whether or not this case was delayed, and therefore he has
never suffered any prejudice resulting from the tape not being available in October of 1995.
However, assuming, arguendo, that the defendant can articulate that he would have been
prejudiced by a continuance in October of 1995, the State asserts that absent an argument that the
State acted in bad faith by suppressing the tape, the defendant was never entitled to demand that the
prosecutor produce a tape not within its control or suffer a bar to further prosecution. See Arizona
v. Youngblood 488 U.S. 51,102 L.Ed.2d281,109 S.Ct. 333,reh. den. 488 U.S. 1051,102
L.Ed.2d 1007,109 S.Ct. 885 (1988). Rather, his most immediate remedy would have been going to
trial without the tape.
In Youngblood investigators negligently stored semen samples and clothing in such a
manner that the items were later useless for the performance of tests that would have tended to
prove or disprove the defendant's identity as the abductor of a ten-year-old boy who had been
sexually assaulted. Id. at 52-5,102 L.Ed.2d at 285-7. On this issue, the United States Supreme
Court noted that the defendant had raised no claim that the State had acted in bad faith in causing
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the potential evidence to be unavailable for the defendant's use, and the Court further noted that the
defendant could say no more of the evidence than that it might have proved exculpatory. Id. at 57,
102 L.Ed.2d at 289. Noting precedent set forth in California v. Trombetta 467 U.S. 479,81
L.Ed.2d 413,104 S.Ct 2528 (1984) (holding that DUI defendant was not denied a fair trial for
failure to preserve breath test samples which were destroyed in good faith), the Youngblood Court
held that "...unless the criminal defendant can show badfaith on the part of the police, failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Id. at 58,
102 L.Ed.2d at 289 (emphasis added). In this case, like in Youngblood the defendant has raised no
argument that the State suppressed evidence in bad faith.
Moreover, unlike in Youngblood in this case the evidence was never irretrievably lost, but
rather the State merely encountered a delay in causing its production. Noting that URCrP 25(b)( 1)
specifically allows for the dismissal of a case for unreasonable delay, and that URCrP 25(d).
provides that a dismissal for unreasonable delay shall not bar further prosecution, the defendant
may be viewed as having been given a proper remedy by the dismissal without prejudice to avoid
additional unreasonable delay.

3

The State acknowledges that the defendant would be entitled to a dismissal-with-prejudice if the trial court had
found that there had been an unconstitutional delay. See URCrP 25(d). This issue is foreclosed, though, because
Judge Dever's findings of fact include thefindingthat the defendant did not complain of delay. Finding #7,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal, at appendix B.
10

CONCLUSION
The Court should hold that it is error to construe an order of dismissal as a bar to further
prosecution unless the order is accompanied by specific findings supporting the remedy of
dismissal-with-prejudice as prescribed by Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Court should further hold that the interests ofjustice are not promoted when a defendant pursues
dismissal rather than a fair resolution of the case on its merits, and therefore a defendant is not
entitled to dismissal as a remedy unless he makes a showing that no other remedy would afford him
a fair trial. In this case, the defendant has not sought a leveling of the playing field to ensure that he
will receive a fair trial on the merits; rather, he has instead sought to manipulate a factor beyond
the prosecutor's control for the purpose of avoiding trial. On these facts, andfromthe holdings
urged above, the State prays that the Court rule that this case was dismissed in error and remand
this case for an expeditious trial.

fl'%>day of February, 1997
Respectfully submitted this _/^_
E.NEALGUNN ARSON
Salt Lake District Attorney, by

STEPHEN MERCER,
Deputy District Attorney
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day of February, 1997.
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APPENDIX A

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
Salt Lake County Attorney
STEPHEN MERCER, Bar No. 6931
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

IN DIVISION II OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 7
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTIOOTOR
RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
PAUL BURNINGHAM,

Case Nb. 955039908TC
Hon7. LEE DEVER

Defendant.

The State of Utah, by and through its codnsel, Stephen Mercer, submits this
memorandum in support of its motion that thejCourt reconsider its ruling of August 5,
1996, and rescind its order dismissing this case with prejudice.

FACTS
In October of 1995, due to events beyond me control of the prosecutor in this
case, the State failed to make discovery materials available to the defendant pertaining
to his May, 1995, arrest for DUI. These materials, more specifically a video tape,
would be valuable evidence at trial, but the State could have presented its case without
the video. Rather than seeking the suppression of the video at trial, or seeking a
continuance if the defense felt the video might prove exculpatory, or even arguing that
a continuance would further prejudice the defense, the defendant instead argued that he
was entitled to a dismissal with prejudice as the remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.

Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration
State v. Buraingham
Page 2
Such a motion was initially denied by Judge Palmer, and when the State could not
obtain the video without further delay, and before he entertained another motion by the
defendant, Judge Palmer executed an order of dismissal proposed by the State's motion
to dismiss without prejudice.
The State refiled the case shortly after the original dismissal without any
complaint by the defendant until the case had progressed another six months. The
defendant then submitted a memorandum in which he argued that the original dismissal
should be viewed as an involuntary dismissal against the State pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore the State should be barred from further
proceedings and ordered to pay costs. At the hearing on the motion on August 5,
1996, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the Rules of Civil Procedure
should apply, but, contrary to the order of dismissal pursuant to the State's motion to
dismiss without prejudice, and contrary the State's argument that the defendant was
never entitled to a dismissal with prejudice, the Court ruled that the original dismissal
had been with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
At the hearing on the motion in this matter, the State and defense each invested
a considerable portion of the oral argument to the issue of the applicability of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, which the Court found the defendant relied upon erroneously. The
State also argued that the order executed by Judge Palmer was proposed by the State in
its motion to dismiss without prejudice, but this point was not belabored. It was
further argued that the defendant was never entitled to a dismissal with prejudice for
the complained of discovery violation, but rather the remedy he should have sought was
the suppression of the video tape from trial. Although these arguments were not found

Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration
State v. Burningham
Page 3
persuasive by the Court at the time of oral arguments, the State now presents the Court
with this memorandum to show the authority favoring the reinstatement of this
prosecution before executing a final order of dismissal,
I. Pursuant to Rule 25(c), Judge Palmer could not have responded
to the State's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice with a
Dismissal With Prejudice Without Explicitly Saying So
If the effect of Judge Palmer's order of dismissal of this case was to dismiss this
case with prejudice, then this was an appealable order order pursuant to Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the State should have been placed on notice of
this pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 25(c)
requires that orders of dismissal be accompanied by a statement of the reasons
therefore. See Salt Lake Citv v. Dorman-Ligh. 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1996)
(construing Rule 25(c)). Where the order in question is accompanied by no
contemporaneous statement of reasons contradictory to the State's motion for dismissal
without prejudice, the dismissal cannot be viewed as entered for any purpose other than
that stated in the motion. See ]d-, at 456. Moreover, uIn the rare case in which the
trial court dismisses a criminal information because of the misbehavior of a
prosecutor, the court must enter findings that carefully specify which Rule 25
provisions it relied upon." Id. (Emphasis added).

II. The Defendant had a Duty to Mitigate his Injury
The State next addresses whether dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate
remedy if any lesser remedy would relieve the prejudice, if any occured. The State
submits that any prejudice that may have flowed from the delay in providing discovery
of the video tape did not significantly hamper the defendant's preparation of his defense

Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration
State v. Burningham
Page 4
because the tape only depicts an event in which the defendant was a participant, and
which both the defendant and the arresting officer can testify. As a participant himself,
the defendant should be able to inform his counsel of the contents of the tape so that its
preview would not be a necessary prerequisite for trial preparation.
Moreover, even if the Court views the preview of the tape as a necessity in the
defendant's preparation for trial, the Court cannot view the introduction of the video
tape as essential to case against the defendant because many, if not most, DUI trials
proceed in the absence of such video taped evidence. Therefore, this case could have
proceeded to trial without prejudice to the defenant simply by ordering the tape
inadmissible in the State's case in chief. See State v. Kull. 688 P.2d 1327 (Ore. 1984)
(defendant entitled to suppression of video tape which was requested in discovery but
which was not produced until four days before trial). Accordingly, since the defendant
could have mitigated the effect of not previewing the tape by obtaining an order of
suppression, he was not entitled to any other relief pursuant to Rule 16(g) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Christofferson. 793 P.2d 944, 947-8 (Utah
App. 1990), State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1988)..
In Christofferson, a police detecitive brought to the prosecutor's attention on the
day of trial a material statement of the defendant, but the prosecutor did not make this
known to the defense until the witness recounted the statement in his testimony. Upon
hearing the statement, defense counsel did not object, move for a continuance, or move
for a mistrial, but rather he later moved for a dismissal with prejudice as the remedy
for prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, and on the
defendant's appeal the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court by holding that a
defendant has a duty to mitigate the affect of a discovery violation, and if he pursues a

Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration
State v. Burningham
Page 5
dismissal where a less harsh remedy would relieve the prejudice, then he waives the
claim of prejudice. Id.
This rule continues the line of reasoning employed by the Utah Supreme Court
in Griffiths. In Griffiths, the defendant was confronted just before trial with statements
attributed to him which had not been disclosed earlier in discovery because a police
investigator had not provided them to the prosecutor. These statements were pivotal to
the defense because they contradicted the account of an alibi witness. Rather than
moving for a continuance before trial to re-evaluate the defense that would be
presented, the defendant objected to the admission of the statements, and when they
were admitted, he moved for a mistrial. Just like the holding in Christofferson. the
Supreme Court held in Griffiths that the defendant's failure to timely seek a less harsh
remedy which would adequately relieve the prejudice operated as a waiver of any relief
under Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Griffiths at 883.
Applying the reasoning of Christofferson and Griffiths to this case, the State
argues that because this trial could have gone forward without any prejudice to the
defendant if the video at issue were never introduced by the State, and because the
defendant has not pursued this remedy, but rather he has pursued a dismissal with
prejudice, he has failed to mitigate the discovery violation and accordingly he has
waived any right to relief under Rule 16(g) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the rules established by State v. Christofferson and State v.
Griffiths, the defendant was not entitled to pursue the remedy of dismissal if a less
harsh remedy would have alleviated any actual or anticipated prejudice. By foregoing
these less harsh remedies, the defendant has waived any claim to relief under Rule
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16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, because it is rare that a
defendant is ever entitled to dismissal with prejudice as a remedy for prosecutorial
misconduct, and because Judge Palmer's order of dismissal in response to the State's
motion to dismiss without prejudice does not show any reason why it should be viewed
as a dismissal with prejudice as is required by Rule 25(c), the Court should now reject
the defendant's assertion that the State is barred, and allow this case to proceed to trial.

DATED t h i s < ^ d a y of August, 1996.

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

STEPHEN MERCER
Deputy District Attorney
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F ; l ED

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
Salt Lake County Attorney
STEPHEN MERCER, Bar No. 6931
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

96 SEP 27 P i l a r *
S/.i_ .

IN DIVISION II OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
)

PAUL BURNINGHAM,

Case No. 955039908TC
)

Defendant.

Hon. LEE DEVER

This matter having come before the Court on August 2, 1996, on the
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that further prosecution in this case is
barred pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court having
considered the argument presented on behalf of the defendant by D. Bruce Oliver, and
having considered the argument presented on behalf of the State by Stephen Mercer,
and the Court declining the State's motion for reconsideration, the following findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and order are entered in writing as mandated by Rule 25 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On May 30, 1995, a criminal prosecution was commenced against the
defendant relating to an allegation arising from conduct occurring on May 17, 1995.
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The matter, which was issued the case number 955017625 TC, was assigned to Judge
Phillip K. Palmer.
2. On August 21, 1995, the defendant filed a motion for discovery.
3. On October 23, 1995, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion to
compel discovery of a video tape which recorded the defendant's stop and arrest.
Pursuant to that motion, the State was ordered to produce the tape within 5 days or the
case would be dismissed.
4. Having failed to obtain the tape from the arresting officer so that it could be
provided as ordered, the State moved to dismiss this case on October 31, 1995.
5. On November 1, 1995, Judge Palmer executed the order proposed by the
State. That order was silent as to whether to dismissal was to be with or without
prejudice.
6. On November 29, 1995, the State refiled charges in this matter. The case
was then issued case number 955039908 TC and assigned to this Court.
7. On May 13, 1996, Bruce Oliver filed a memorandum of law in support of a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of a bar pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. The
defendant has sought dismissal as his only remedy since first complaining of a
discovery violation. The defendant has never complained that the result of the
discovery violation was a denial of his right to a speedy trial.
8. On August 2, 1996, this Court conducted a hearing on the defendant's
motion. During this hearing, in addition to contesting the defendant's assertion that the
rules of civil procedure did not control, the State also argued that the defendant was
never entitled to dismissal as a remedy for a discovery violation is some less sever
remedy would redress the discovery violation.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern in criminal cases where
there are no other applicable rules or statutes, Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (URCrP) governs the dismissal of criminal cases without trial, and therefore
the defendant improperly looks outside of the URCrP for support of his motion to
dismiss that case.
2. Because the defendant does not properly rely on the rules of civil procedure
in support of his motion, his demand for fees cannot be granted.
3. Although the defendant has not argued that the effect of Judge Palmer's
Order of Dismissal was with prejudice, because the State did not move to dismiss until
after Judge Palmer's admonition to provide discovery within five days had expired, the
effect of that order was the dismissal of this case with prejudice.

ORDER
As a result of the State's failure to provide discovery as originally ordered by
Judge Palmer, this case is ordered dismissed with prejudice.

BY THE COURT this

day of October, 1996.

LEE A. DEVER
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Counsel for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that an original and a copy of these proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of dismissal were provided to D. Bruce
Oliver, counsel for the defendant, by mailing them to 180 South 300 West, Suite 210,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218, on this 2/ffi day of September, 1996. I further
certify that a copy of this document has been filed with the court, and that the original
is to be approved by counsel for the defendant within ten days of filing, or a duplicate
original will be submitted to the court for adoption without the approval o£-the
defendant.
~~
/

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT
PAUL BURNINGHAM HEARING
AUGUST 2, 1996
15 min

Oliver addresses Court

28 min

State addresses Court ("never entitled to dismissal" at 31 minutes)

32 min

Oliver again addresses Court

35 min

Court rules. Judge Lee Dever:
"I think the appropriate place to look in determination of what it is going to be
here is the orders that have been previously entered in case number 955017625. First of
all, I agree with the State that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in this case
because there are specific rules in the Rules of Criminal Procedure that apply and therefore
they take precident over any civil rules because that's what the statute so provides.
There's [sic] two issues here. Whether or not there should be a dismissal pursuant to rule
16 or 25, as the case may be, the question really is whether a dismissal based on a court
order can be deemed to be dismissal with prejudice in a criminal matter if it is not for
grounds that are specifically provided for in the Rule. If you look at Rule 25, which is
dismissal without trial, which I believe is what we are doing here—this is a dismissal
without trial— it talks about if the dismissal is under certain grounds—unconstitutional
delay or statute of limitations—it is a bar. However, it does not talk about whether it is a
dismissal with prejudice, and therefore barred, if it is for other grounds. However, the
Rule also provides that in its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance ofjustice,
the Court may, of its own initiative, order it dismissed. The question is: Can the Court
provide how the dismissal is to be? In this particular matter, the record indicates the
plaintiff I mean the defendant in this matter, requested discovery on August 21, 1995,
then on September 29, 1995, they wanted to look at the video. If by October 23, 1995, if
the State had not made it available, the Court denied the motion for dismissal at that time,
and stated that the State had five days to provide the tape, and stated on the docket that if
the tape is not provided the case will be dismissed. The five days ordered by the Court ran
on the 30th of October, either the fact that that was a weekend intervening, nothing was
filed by the State at that time. On the 31st, the Statefiledthe motion to dismiss. The
question then becomes whether or not the State has the right to refile in this matter? It is
my reading that underneath Rule 16 or Rule 25, that it is in the docket in this matter that
the Court intended to order a dismissal in this case, and did order a dismissal. Giving the
State three months in which to respond, I am going to order that my interpretation of this
matter is that the case was dismissed and I will grant the defendant's motion in this matter
to dismiss this matter in case number 955039908 and I'll order that it be dismissed with
prejudice."
"I don't believe the issue of fees is appropriate because it is handled under rules of
civil procedure, therefore that motion, that request, is denied."
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1
JUNE 5, 1996
3:19 PM
UHP Case: 955017625 TC
Agency No.: RID95381
WEDNESDAY

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC
Citation:

D240640

Traffic Court Case
Judge: Philip K. Palmer

BURNINGHAM, PAUL SERGE
610 SOUTH 1ST EAST
BOUNTIFUL
UT 84010

NO OTN # FOR THIS CASE
Charges
Violation Date: 05/17/95
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 41-6-44
Sev: MB Attrib: L,
2. RED LIGHT VIOL
41-6-24
Sev: MC
3. DRIVE ON SUSPENDED LICENSE
53-3-227.S
Sev: MB

Bail
602.00
52.00
302.00

Proceedings
05/30/95 Case filed on 05/30/95.
ARR
scheduled for 8/14/95 at 9:00 A in room 3 with PKP
PRE-TRIAL RELEASE AGREEMENT FILED
06/05/95 D A NOTIFIED BY NOTICE OF ARR
08/14/95 Mis Arraignment
JUDGE: Philip K. Palmer
TAPE: 1832
COUNT:
3041
ATD: None Present
PRO: GREENLIEF, JOSEPH
Deft is present
Information was read in court
PTC
scheduled for 08/25/95 at 0900 A in room ? with PKP
Chrg: 41-6-44
Plea Not Guilty
Chrg: 41-6-24
Plea Not Guilty
Chrg: 53-3-227.S
Plea Not Guilty
DEFENDANT WILL HIRE BRUCE OLIVER
08/16/95 FILED ANSWER TO REQUEST/MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
08/22/95 JUDGE PALMER SIGNED MOTION AND ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE
PTC
rescheduled to 9/11/95 at 9:00 A in room ? with PKP
CLERK NOTIFIED ATD BRUCE OLIVER BY PHONE AND SENT COPY OF
DOCKET ENTRY TO DIST ATTY
08/23/95 FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL (BRUCE OLIVER) PLEA OF NOT GUILTY
AND DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL
FILED REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
08/28/95 FILED MOTION AND ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE
09/01/95 PALMER/KHB OFF TAPE C/O CLEAR DATE WITH ATD
CLERK CALLED ATTY BRUCE OLIVER AND CLEARED DATE OF 9/29/95 AT
2:00 PM WITH HIS SECRETARY
CLERK NOTIFIED DIST ATTY BY SENDING A COPY OF THIS DOCKET ENTRY
PTC
rescheduled to 9/29/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with PKP
09/29/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE):
JUDGE: Philip K. Palmer
TAPE: 2116
COUNT:
3069
Deft Present

KWS
KWS
TSB
RBM
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
DGP
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
DGP
DGP
DGP
DGP
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB

D O C K E T

Defendant

Citation:

Page
2
JUNE 5, 1996
3:19 PM
UHP Case: 955017625 TC
Agency No.: RID95381
Traffic Court Case
WEDNESDAY

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC
D240640

BURNINGHAM, PAUL SERGE
09/29/95

ATD: OLIVER, BRUCE
PRO: BAKER, LARRY
PTC
scheduled for 10/23/95 at 1100 A in room ? with PKP
ON MOTION OF DEF, C/O CONTINUE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
DEF REPORTED THEY NEED TO LOOK AT VIDEO TAPE
10/23/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE):
JUDGE: Philip K. Palmer
TAPE: 2361
COUNT:
650
Deft Present
ATD: OLIVER, D BRUCE
PRO: KISHNER, SHARON
MO CRIM scheduled for 11/06/95 at 0900 A in room ? with PKP
STATE HAS NOT MADE TAPE AVAILABLE - PROBLEMS GETTING FROM THE
OFFICER (OFFICER IS NOW IN PANGUITCH)
COURT DENIES DEF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AT THIS TIME
COURT GRANTS STATE MOTION FOR 5 DAYS TO PROVIDE TAPE TO DEF
O CONTINUE FOR MOTION HEARING, IF TAPE IS NOT PROVIDED THE
CASE WILL BE DISMISSED
LO/31/95 F I D MOTION TO DISMISS
PA:
ENTERED ORDER OF DISMISSAL
1 1 / 0 1 / 9 5 M»
CRIM on 11/ 6/95 was cancelled
ntered case disposition of: Dismissed
Chrg: 41-6-44 Fxnd: Dismissed
Chrg: 41-6-24 Find: Dismissed
Chrg: 53-3-227.S Find: Dismissed
11/06/95 Archive Box Number entered was 95TC35
Citation Amount:
Additional Case Data
Sentence Summary
1. DUI
2. RED LIGHT
3. DRIVE ON SUSP LI

Plea: Not Guilty
Plea: Not Guilty
Plea: Not Guilty

Case Disposition
Disposition....: Dismissed
Parties
Atty for Defendant
OLIVER, D BRUCE
180 SOUTH 300 WEST
SUITE 260
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84101
Personal Description
Sex: M
DOB: 04/20/63
Dr. Lie. No.: 13229566

Find: Dismissed
Find: Dismissed
Find: Dismissed
DATE: 11/01/95

Home Phone: (
Work Phone: (

State: UT

Expires:

)
)

KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
DGP
DGP
DGP
DGP
DGP
DGP
DGP
BAT

APPENDIX D

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
SHARON KISHNER, Bar No. 5741
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State, Room #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210
Telephone: (801)468-3422

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS

-vs-

CaseNo.955017625TC
PAUL BURNINGHAM,
Hon. Philip K. Palmer
Defendant.
SHARON KISHNER, attorney for plaintiff, moves this court for an order dismissing the
above-entitled matter without prejudice, for the reason that as of this date, the State has been
unable to produce the videotape of the incident.
DATED this 30th day of October, 1995.
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

SHARON KISHNER
Deputy District Attorney

APPENDIX E

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
SHARON KISHNER, Bar No. 5741
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State, Room #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210
Telephone: (801)468-3422

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

)

CaseNo.955017625TC

)

Hon. Philip K. Palmer

-vs-

PAUL BURNINGHAM,
Defendant.
Based upon the motion of the Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the information in the above-entitled matter be
dismissed.
DATED this

day of October, 1995.
BYTHECOURT:

PHILIP K. PALMER
MAGISTRATE

Note: The signed original order of dismissal was not available for duplication at the time
of the preparation of this brief.

APPENDIX F

D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 955039908
PAUL SERGE BURNINGHAM,
Judge LEE DEVER
Defendant,

Comes now the defendant above named by and through
counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and hereby moves this Court to dismiss
this action against defendant based upon the Utah State
Constitution Article I, section 12, the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 41, and the accompanying Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, which is incorporated herein by this
reference.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

7

day of May, 1996.

^e
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

\v / \ vfe

D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
Case No. 955039908
PAUL SERGE BURNINGHAM,
Judge LEE DEVER
Defendant,

Comes now the defendant above named by and through
counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and hereby submits the following
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to
Dismiss, which Motion is incorporated herein by this reference.

FACTS

1.

Defendant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence

of Alcohol of May 17, 1995.
2.

That this case was originally filed before Judge

Palmer.
3.

Defendant filed a Request for Discovery.

4.

At the time of the Pre-trial in this matter defendant

requested a copy of the tape recording made at the time of the
arrest of Defendant.
5-

That Judge Palmer ordered that the tape be provided to

Defendant.
6.

That Defendant provided the prosecutor with a blank

tape to make the copy.
7.

The State filed a Motion to Dismiss the action along

with an Order to be signed by Judge Palmer.
8.

That the action was dismissed.

9.

That the prior case number was 955017652TC.

ARGUMENT

Both the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Utah provide that a person may not
be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Article I,
section 12 of the Utah State Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
2

same offense, (emphasis added)
Id,

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides as follows:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due
process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation. (emphasis added)
Id.

Each of these provisions provides that once a person has

been placed in jeopardy then that same person may not again be
placed in jeopardy for the same offense.

This is a well

established point of law.
In the current case Mr. Burningham has been placed in
jeopardy and the case was dismissed.

He has now been placed in

jeopardy a second time for the same offense.

This time it has

been increased to a class A misdemeanor from a class B
misdemeanor in front of Judge Palmer.
is extremely punitive.

The refiling of the case

The prosecution of Mr. Burningham is

barred by double jeopardy and therefore the case should be
dismissed.
This case is further barred by the fact that it was
dismissed with prejudice and therefore may not be refiled again.
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 provides:
Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
3

shall disclose to the defense upon request the
following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements
of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the
defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree
of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown should be
made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all
disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make
disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as
privileged, the defense shall disclose to the
prosecutor such information as required by
statute relating to alibi or insanity and any
other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the
defense attorney shall make all disclosures
at least ten days before trial or as soon as
practicable. He has a continuing duty to make
disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably
requires, the prosecutor or defense may make
disclosure by notifying the opposing party
that material and information may be
inspected, tested or copied at specified
reasonable times and places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court
may at any time order that discovery or
inspection be denied, restricted, or
deferred, or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the
4

court may permit the party to make such
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of
a written statement to be inspected by the
judge alone. If the court enters an order
granting relief following such an ex parte
showing, the entire text of the party's
statement shall be sealed and preserved in
the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of
the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has
failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery
or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing evidence
not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the
circumstances.
Id.

In this rules it allows and permits discovery to be had

between the parties.

The Court is allowed the discretion to

determine the limits of the discovery.

The Court is further

allowed to set out the consequences of a parties failure to
participate in discovery or for failure to comply with the
Court's Order concerning discovery.

In the current case both

parties were advised by the Court on October 23, 1995 that the
case would be dismissed if indeed the tape was not produced to
defendant.
Dismiss.

On October 31, 1995 the State filed a Motion to
On that same date Judge Palmer entered his Order of

Dismissal.

This is all in accordance with the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure Rule 16.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 81 (e) provides as
follows:
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules
shall apply to all special statutory proceedings,
except insofar as such rules are by their nature
clearly inapplicable. Where a statute provides for
5

procedure by reference to any part of the former
Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be
in accordance with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall
not apply to proceedings in uncontested probate
and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all
proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue
therein, including the enforcement of any judgment
or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts.
These rules shall apply to civil actions commenced
in the city or justice courts, except insofar as
such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable to such courts or proceedings
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order
of an administrative board or agency. These rules
shall apply to the practice and procedure in
appealing from or obtaining a review of any order,
ruling or other action of an administrative board
or agency, except insofar as the specific
statutory procedure in connection with any such
appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent
with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These
rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect
of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any
rule so applied does not conflict with any
statutory or constitutional requirement.
Id.

Subsection (e) provides that the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure apply to criminal matters at any time when they are not
is specific conflict with any other provision or are
unconstitutional.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 41

provides as follows:
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing
a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion
for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a
6

stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action• Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the United States
or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall
not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or
of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in
an action tried by the court without a jury, has
completed the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted,
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If
the court renders judgment on the merits against
the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule
shall be made before a responsive pleading is
7

served or, if there is none, before the
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any
court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the
court may make such order for the payment of costs
of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action
until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse
party. Should a party dismiss his complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a
provisional remedy has been allowed such party,
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such
provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by
the court to the adverse party against whom such
provisional remedy was obtained. (emphasis added)
Id.

In the current case the dismissal of the action was by the

plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.

In the Order prepared by the

plaintiff there is no reference to the dismissal being without
prejudice.

This would mean that the dismissal was with prejudice

and on the merits.

Understanding that the matter has been

dismissed on the merits it is inappropriate that this matter be
refiled.

The law of the case is that the case has been

dismissed.

Defendant is entitled to the application of res

judicata, or double jeopardy or both.

If the State is free to

refile then at a minimum the threat of Judge Palmer to dismiss
for failure to comply with discovery orders is hollow and without
substance.
Further the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 41 provide that the party refiling an action after previous
dismissal should pay the costs of the prior case for the opposing
party.

This would be appropriate if indeed the Court permits

this matter to go forward.

In the alternative if this Court
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agrees with defendant then sanctions pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are in order and those sanctions should be
commensurate with the cost to the defendant of the second case.
This matter should be dismissed and no further action taken by
the State.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based on the foregoing, Defendant
respectfully requests this Court to dismiss this action.
Defendant has twice been put in jeopardy since the first action
was dismissed with prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING
MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to:

Salt Lake District

Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.
Dated this

/ T"t

day of May, 1996,

CfUftJiShM
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